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Bankruptcy-Preferences-Trust Receipt Transaction as a Void-
able Preference Under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act-Harvey Distribut-
ing Company executed trust receipts to a finance company recognizing the
latter's security interest in some coin-operated machines held by Harvey
for sale. Subsequently the transaction was recorded as provided by the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act,' thus preserving the finance company's secu-
rity interest as entruster against the claims of others. Eleven months
after recordation Harvey went bankrupt with the machines still in its pos-
session, and the entruster claimed to be a preferred creditor to the ex-
tent of its lien on the machines. The bankruptcy court refused the lien
and characterized the transaction as a voidable preference under the terms of
§ 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,2 reasoning that the act makes such a transfer
of a security interest to a creditor a preference unless it is so far perfected
at least four months prior to the petition for bankruptcy that a potential
bona-fide purchaser of the property could not prevail over the transferee.8
Since the Uniform Trust Receipts Act provides that bona-fide purchasers
in the ordinary course of trade take the property free of the entruster's
security interest,4 the transfer was not so perfected, and was therefore
voidable as a preference. In re Harvey Distributing Co., Bankruptcy No.
17-965, CCH BANiR. LAW REP. (3d ed.) If 56,616, Jan. 11, 1950.
Prior to 1938 § 60 had failed to prevent the use of secret liens by
creditors as a means of guaranteeing full payment of their debts in the
event of bankruptcy. The creditor with such a lien could be sure of more
than his share of the debtor's assets, since at any time before bankruptcy
he could make the lien notorious and then prevail over the trustee in bank-
ruptcy as a prior lien holder. Meanwhile, such a transaction, even if a
preference, could not be made the basis for involuntary bankruptcy because
of its secrecy.5 Furthermore, other creditors might be induced to make
1. VA. Coa § 6-561 (1950).
2. 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1946).
3. This over-simplification is necessary in the interests of clarity. § 60a lists six
separate elements of a preference: (1) the transfer of a debtor's property, (2) to or
for the benefit of a creditor, (3) for or on account of an antecedent debt, (4) during
insolvency, (5) within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, (6)
which transfer gives the creditor a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors
of the same class. § 60b then makes the preference voidable only if the creditor, at
the time of the transfer, had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
At first glance not all of these elements are apparent in the trust receipt trans-
action. However, the court apparently found a transfer of the debtor's property in
the recordation of the trust receipt, since that recordation gave to the creditor a secu-
rity interest which it did not have at the time of the execution of the trust receipt.
See 3 CoL.miR, BANKRUPTCY 942 (14th ed. 1941). Then, since the transfer was not
perfected prior to bankruptcy, the last sentence of § 60a applies, prescribing that "...
it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before bankruptcy." Viewed from
this point of time, the transfer was made on account of an antecedent debt-the notes
for the purchase price of the machines given to the finance company at the time of
the transaction. And of course the debtor was insolvent ". . . immediately before
bankruptcy." The fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Adams v. City Bank & Trust Co.,
115 F.2d 453 (1940), had rejected this somewhat strained definition of an antecedent
debt, but was overruled by the Supreme Court in Corn Exchange National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943) on the grounds that Congress apparently
intended to strike down even the secret lien given in exchange for a present considera-
tion.
4. VA. CODE §6-558(2)a et seq. (1950).




loans in reliance upon the apparently unencumbered property. In spite
of the inequitable result, the courts protected the device from attack as
a voidable preference by holding that though it was made public and thus
perfected within four months of bankruptcy, such perfection related back
to the actual transaction, which was usually not a voidable preference be-
cause made prior to the four month period.6 To correct this situation,
Congress amended § 60 in 1938 so that, for the purpose of determining
whether any such transfers of security interests were voidable preferences,
they would be deemed to have been made only when ". . . no bona-
fide purchaser and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any of the
rights. . . ." of the transferee therein. 7  As a means of inequitably de-
pleting the debtor's assets, the secret lien was thus rendered useless, since
its effective date was brought forward to the date of its notoriety, when a
bona-fide purchaser could not acquire better rights, and since this latter
date was within four months of the petition for bankruptcy, the lien was
a voidable preference. However, the trust receipt transaction, when used
to finance the purchase and resale of goods, as in this case, subordinates
the rights of the entruster to those of a bona-fide purchaser of the goods
in the ordinary course of trade, it being the very object of this device
to give purchasers of the property good title while protecting the en-
truster's security interest prior to the sale.8 But since the transaction
qualifies as a preference in other respects,9 the priority it gives bona-fide
purchasers forces its inclusion as a voidable preference under § 60. This
result would force an abandonment of this highly useful security device,
since it fails to protect the entruster just when that protection is most
needed.
Though the trust receipt transaction is thus technically a voidable
preference in bankruptcy, no one has contended that Congress intended
such a result when the bona-fide purchaser test was placed in § 60a in
1938.10 As mentioned above, the test was formulated to prevent the
secret depletion of the debtor's assets, and thus should not apply to assets
which in reality never belonged to him. Nor can it be cogently argued
that § 60 should apply because such assets appeared to be the bankrupt's
and were thus rightfully relied upon by subsequent creditors, for the
trust receipt arrangement is struck down by § 60 in spite of the recorda-
tion of the entruster's interest in the goods. It therefore appears that jus-
tice to the parties in this case would demand a relaxation of the § 60 rule.
However, the court, aware that the rule had previously been used to
destroy other important security devices,11 and that an amendment to the
section was before Congress,12 chose to force the matter on the legislature
by denying the entruster's claim. Since the situation had already attracted
the serious attention of Congress, to decide the case unjustly seems un-
necessary. However, the amendment has appeared, and seems certain to
6. Martin v. The Commercial Bank, 245 U.S. 513 (1918) ; Bunch v. Maloney, 246
U.S. 658 (1918) ; Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268 (1915) ; Carey v.
Donohue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916) ; Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90 (1912).
7. 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1946).
8. Thayer, Trust Receipts, 16 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1941).
9. See note 3 supra.
10. 3 CoLLIER, BAxxRuIrcY 891 (1941) presents a comprehensive list of the diffi-
culties leading to the 1938 amendment.
11. Assignments of accounts receivable and factors' liens had both been invalidated
in the same manner. Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S.
434 (1943) ; In re Vardaman Shoe Company, 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943) ; Lib-
erty Motors and Engineering Corp., Bankruptcy No. 10-012.
12. The proposed amendment as discussed by Professor McLaughlin in 60 HARV.
L. Rav. 233 (1946) was called to the court's attention by counsel.
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prevent further decisions such as this by scrapping the bona-fide pur-
chaser test in so far as personalty is concerned. Transfers of such prop-
erty are now perfected whenever a potential lien creditor could not ac-
quire better rights to the property than the transferee. 13 Since recorda-
tion of the transaction protects the entruster from such creditors, the trust
receipt transaction becomes once more a safe and useful security device.
Bastards-Evidentiary Weight of Blood Tests to Prove Non-
Paternity-Respondent had sexual intercourse with complainant.
Thereafter complainant became pregnant and respondent discussed mar-
riage with her. Twins were born. Pursuant to court order, blood speci-
mens were taken and blood grouping tests made in accordance with Me.
Rev. Stat. c. 153, § 34 (1944). In spite of the scientific tests finding that
the respondent could not have been the father, the jury found him to be
so. A motion for new trial was granted on the ground that there was no
evidence tending to show that the blood tests were improperly made, and
in absence of such evidence the tests must be taken to prove conclusively
the non-paternity of the respondent. Jordan v. Mace, 69 A.2d 670 (Me.
1949).
Although blood tests cannot be used to prove paternity, in certain
classes of cases their scientific validity is beyond question.1 However, the
conclusive findings of science have not been accepted as such by the law.
The jurisdictions split on whether the alleged father has a right to have
blood tests made in the first instance.2 Eight states have settled the ques-
tion by the passage of statutes.3 The further problem remains as to what
weight should be accorded these tests when they are held to be admissible.
Nearly all jurisdictions place no more weight on this than on other
evidence,4 e.g., evidence that the alleged father had sexual intercourse with
the complainant. The above mentiond statutes have had practically no
effect on this issue, for none go beyond allowing the tests to be made and
13. Pub. L. No. 461, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., § 1 (March 18, 1950). Paragraph (2)
of § 60a now reads: "(2) For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a
transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to have been made or
suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon
such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could
become superior to the rights of the transferee." The amendment, Senate Bill 88, as
amended by the House committee report containing the amendment and its history
can be found in CCH BANXR. LAW RF'. (3d ed.) f 56,641 (1950).
1. SCHATKIN, Dispuran PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 123 (1944). _For explanation of
the blood grouping tests and charts which set forth the scientific rules of exclusion see
Note, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 72.
2. Following cases have held blood tests could be taken: St. Louis-San Francisco
Rr. Co. v. Murphy, 168 Ark. 330, 270 S.W. 956 (1925); Arais v. Kolensnikoff, 10
Cal.2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043 (1937) ; Cooke v. Miller, 103 Conn. 267, 130 Atl. 571 (1925) ;
Hayt v. Brewster Gordon & Co., 199 App. Div. 68, 191 N.Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dep't
1921) ; Camp v. Welling, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 448, 30 Ohio Supp. 333 (1936) ; Common-
wealth v. Zammarrilli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931). Other cases have held that blood
tests could not be taken: City of Ottawa v. Gilliland, 63 Kan. 165, 65 Pac. 252 (1901);
Graves v. City of Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266, 54 N.W. 757 (1893).
3. Maine, ME. Rav. STAT. c. 153, § 34 (1944) ; Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE, Art.
12, § 17 (Flack, Supp. 1943) ; New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §2:99-3,4 (Supp. 1946) ;
New York, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 306a, N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 126a (1935), N.Y.
CRIb. CODE § 68a (1938), Dom. REL. ACT OF THE CITY OF N.Y. § 34 (1942); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. (Michie, Supp. 1945) § 49-7; Ohio, OHIO GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 12122-1,2 (Page, Supp. 1946) ; South Dakota, S.D. CODE 36.0602 (1939), Sue. CT.
RULE 540 (1939) ; Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. § 166.105, 325.23 (Brossard, 1943).
4. Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal.2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043 (1937) ; Berry v. Chaplin,
74 Cal.2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946).
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admitted in evidence. None expressly state what evidentiary weight should
be given to these tests.5 At most, the findings are looked upon as ex-
pert testimony,6 to be accepted or rejected by the jury. New York alone
has given conclusive weight to the finding of non-paternity through blood
grouping tests.7 It is questionable whether even this jurisdiction would
have given such effect to the tests in absence of statute. Maine, in the
instant case, clarifies its position taken in a recent case where a jury's
finding contrary to scientific test of non-paternity was upheld.8 The court
in the instant case holds that the only question for the jury is whether
the tests were properly made. If so, then the jury must find in accord-
ance with the scientific facts when they show non-paternity.9 This de-
cision places Maine with New York in giving conclusive weight to ac-
curately conducted tests. The court specifically bases its conclusion on
the pressure of its statute, reasoning that the act shows a legislative intent
to accept the scientific law of non-paternity in such cases as the one be-
fore it, and that such a law goes beyond the opinion of an expert.' 0
There should be no doubt as to the need for giving binding effect
to such scientific findings. In practically all bastardly cases the sympa-
thies of the jury are with the woman whose child has no father to support
it, and against the alleged father who has usually had sexual intercourse
with the complainant. This fact alone generally raises the presumption
of paternity. Whether the mother has had relations with others is usually
a matter peculiarly within her knowledge. In view of these sympathies
and prejudices, few courts have been willing to upset the jury's finding
even where such findings are contrary to scientific facts." Since the
avowed aim of the law is to make the actual father responsible for the
support of his child there is no reason for the law to make one bear this
burden who cannot possibly be the child's father. The easy solution would
be legislative direction giving full weight to these biological findings, but
in absence of such statutes, there seems to be no reason why the courts
cannot take judicial notice of them. Now that blood grouping tests are
fifty years old, it is time for the law to accept what science has long ac-
knowledged to be beyond dispute. Stare decisis should yield in the light
of scientific truth.
Carriers-Federal Bills of Lading Act-Liability for Issuance of
Straight Bill of Lading Without Receipt of Goods-Defendant rail-
road issued a non-negotiable bill of lading in reliance on seller's represen-
tation that the goods described therein were being loaded at the latter's
private siding. Plaintiff-buyer, the named consignee, paid a sight draft
on the strength of the attached bill. The goods were never delivered to
the carrier by the now defunct seller, and buyer sued the railroad for
damages resulting from the carrier's nonreceipt of the shipment. Finding
5. See note 3 supra.
6. 1 U. op CHi. L. :REv. 798 (1934).
7. Saks v. Saks, 189 N.Y. Misc. 667, 71 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. Dor. Rel. Ct. 1947);
Schulze v. Schulze, 35 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; Matter of Lentz, 247 App. Div.
31, 283 N.Y. Supp. 749 (2d Dep't 1935).
8. Jordan v. Davis, 57 A.2d 209 (Me. 1948).
9. Instant case at 673.
10. Id. at 672.
11. Harding v. Harding, 22 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1940); State ex
rel. Slovak v. Holand, 63 Ohio App. 16, 24 N.E.2d 962 (1939).
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the railroad not liable,1 the court held that plaintiff was not the "owner"
of the described goods within the Federal Bills of Lading Act,2 since its
f. o. b. contract of sale called for seller to deliver the goods to the carrier,
and, there having been no delivery, under the Pennsylvania Sales Act
property never passed to the plaintiff.3 Martin Jessee Motors, Inc. v.
Reading Co., 87 F. Supp. 318 (E. D. Pa. 1950).
Common-law England adopted the view that a carrier was not re-
sponsible for injuries caused by its nonreceipt of goods, on the theory
that the carrier's agent was without authority to issue a bill of lading
under such circumstances. 4 While the state courts divided on the is-
sue,5 the early federal decisions 1 accorded with the English holding. At
the instigation of commercial interests, most of the industrial states 7
adopted uniform legislation which permitted recovery against a carrier
by a consignee who had given value for a bill in honest reliance on its
false recital that the goods, noted thereon, were in the carrier's hands.8
In 1915 an identical federal statute was urged on Congress.9 After
passage by the Senate, 10 the proposed bill was amended in the House of
Representatives," so as to render the carrier liable to the owner of the
goods purportedly covered by a straight bill of lading, rather than to the
consignee, as provided in the state enactments.' 2 It was this version which
emerged in 1916 as part of the Federal Bills of Lading Act.'" It is sur-
prising to note a Kentucky holding to the effect that the Act did not
alter the status of non-negotiable bills,14 since the provision under con-
1. Though not suggested by the decision, it is possible that a further fact may
have influenced the court's ruling. The face of the bill of lading in question bore the
carrier's stamped notation: "Shipper's Load & Count", but the words, it appeared,
were only "partially legible". It is provided in § 101 of the Federal Bills of Lading
Act that the carrier may relieve itself of liability for the nonreceipt or misdescription
of goods which it has no opportunity to inspect at the time when the shipper presents
the bill for the carrier's signature by the use of the above inscription. This provision
has been construed as inapplicable, however, where the carrier fails to receive either
some goods or an order from the shipper to move an allegedly loaded freight car. Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry. v. Stephens Nat. Bank of Fremont, 75 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1935),
cert. denied 295 U.S. 738 (1935).
2. 39 STAT. 538 (1916), 49 U.S.C. §81 (1946).
3. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 143 (Purdon, 1948). "Rule 5. If the contract to
sell requires the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer, or at a particular place . . .
the property does not pass until the goods . . . have reached the place agreed upon."
This section corresponds with § 19, Rule 5 of the UNIFORM SALES ACT.
4. Grant v. Norway, 10 C.B. 665 (1852).
5. 2 WILLISTON ON SALES 1027, 1028 (2d ed. 1924).
6. Friedlander v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 130 U.S. 416 (1889) ; Pollard v. Vinton, 105
U.S. 7 (1881) ; The Schooner Freeman, 18 How. 182 (U.S. 1855).
7. By 1916 Conn., Idaho, Ill., Iowa, La., Md., Mass., Mich., N.J., N.Y., Ohio,
Pa., R.I., Vt., and Wash. had adopted the Uniform Bills of Lading Act.
8. § 23 of the UNiFORM BILLs OF LADING ACT provides that "the carrier shall be
liable to: (a) the consignee named in a non-negotiable bill, or (b) the holder of a
negotiable bill, who has given value in good faith relying upon the description therein
of the goods, for damages caused by the nonreceipt by the carrier . . . of all or part
of the goods. .. ."
9. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL LAW, 1 A.B.A.J. 220-22 (1915).
10. SEN. REP. No. 149, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
11. H.R. REP. No. 847, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
12. There is no indication in the report of the Committee that the amendment was
calculated to withhold the right of recovery from all but the holder of "title" within
the Uniform Sales Act. The change was induced, it appears, by a concern for the un-
paid seller's right of stoppage in transit. Id. at 4.
13. 39 STAT. 542 (1916), 49 U.S.C. § 102 (1946).
14. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. State Nat. Bank of Maysville, 280 Ky. 444, 133
S.W.2d 511 (1939). See unfavorable Recent Case Comment in 18 TEXAS L. REv. 332
(1940).
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sideration expressly changed the existing law with respect to false in-
struments of both the straight and order types. The instant decision
frustrates the policy of this legislation in an equally effective, but perhaps
less obvious, manner by construing the key term "owner" against a back-
ground of Sales law.
The present holding serves notice to one who would discount a
straight bill of lading that he must inquire into the whereabouts of "title"
as located by the Uniform Sales Act, or run the risk of parting with value
for a worthless document. Logically, the location of ownership by means
of "sales" determinants may be justified, but such a course is open to
question where, as here, the party whose liability is sought to be deter-
mined is a stranger to the sale.15 The effect of this construction, it ap-
pears, is to render the provision meaningless, since, under Sales theory,
failure to deliver the goods to the carrier ordinarily prevents the passage
of "title" to the buyer-consignee; but it is this very act of non-delivery
which gives rise to the buyer's need for protection. Moreover, the car-
rier is now virtually immune to recovery where the goods described in the
bill are the subject of a sale between consignor and consignee, for the
former clearly suffers no harm from the issuance to it of an instrument
purporting to cover merchandize which it has not surrendered. 16 While
one may sympathize with the court's reluctance to disturb the ancient
railroad practice of emitting bills on the faith of the shipper's integrity,17
it is difficult to justify the emasculation of a statute designed to promote
greater confidence in dealings with shipping documents. Buyers and
financing agencies desiring security will do well to use the negotiable type
bill, where the language of the Act plainly bars the application of the
"title" concept.' 8
Contracts-Forbearance as Consideration Implied from the Exist-
ing Factual Situation-On October 1, 1940 an article appeared in the
local newspaper stating that any of defendant corporation's employees
"called to the colors thru the conscription law will not lose a cent in wages."
In the article the defendant said it would pay to its employees the difference
between what they made at the defendant's plant and what the Government
paid them while in the service. Plaintiff, an employee at the time of pub-
lication, continued in defendant's employ for two years at which time he
enlisted in the Coast Guard.1 After his discharge, plaintiff, who served
15. One learned writer simply assumes that the Uniform Sales Act furnishes
the test of ownership in a situation similar to the present, without questioning whether
different policy considerations may prevail. 2 WLLISTON, op. cit. supra note 5, at
1031. It is interesting to note that under the proposed Uniform Commercial Code
the rights and obligations of buyer and seller are established independently of the
whereabouts of property. Furthermore, the drafters of that legislation issue a caveat
against the mechanical reliance on the new law of Sales for the purpose of locating
"title", where that term is left undefined by another unrelated statute. UNIFORM Com-
MERCIAL CODE, AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE and NAT. CONFERENCE or COatM'RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS § 2-401, Comment 1 (May, 1949).
16. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co. v. American Line SS. Corp., 97 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.
1938).
17. This practice is discussed in note 1 supra.
18. Under both the Federal and Uniform Bills of Lading Acts, it is the holder of
a false negotiable bill who is given the right of action against the carrier. See note 8
mtpra.
1. It appears that plaintiff was going to be drafted momentarily and he preferred
to pick a particular branch of the service, so he enlisted. (Record, p. 24a.). This was
conceded to be an acceptance of the offer.
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for 37 months, sued the defendant corporation to recover on an alleged
contract. The jury awarded plaintiff $1000.2 On appeal judgment was
affirmed, the court holding that plaintiff by remaining with the defendant
corporation until he went into the service was exercising a forbearance
which of itself amounted to a legal consideration. Mickshaw v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., Inc., of Sharon, Pa., 166 Pa. Super. 148, 70 A.2d 467 (1950).
Consideration as a requisite for the enforceability of a promise 3 re-
quires a detriment incurred by the promisee, or a benefit received by the
promisor which has been bargained for as the agreed exchange. 4 For-
bearance to exercise a right or privilege in return for a promise will con-
stitute consideration.5 However, forbearance which is not requested by
the promisor is not consideration; 6 there must be a bona fide forbearance
at the promisor's instance and request.7 Very often a promisor merely in-
tends to make a gift to the promisee conditional upon the happening of
some named event, the happening of which may be detrimental to the
promisee or beneficial to the promisor. In such a case, there is no con-
sideration to make the promise binding, since the detriment or benefit
suffered or received is merely the motive or occasion for the contemplated
gift; it is not the price of a promise bought and paid for.8 In the instant
case the court construed the promise of the added reimbursement as in-
cluding a request to remain in the promisor's employ until such time as
those employees entered the military service. The court concluded that
the employee, therefore, was exercising a forbearance by remaining with
the employer, instead of getting a lucrative war job, Which of itself
amounted to a legal consideration.9
Consideration in the instant case might be found in the favorable good
will established by defendant corporation towards its consuming public and
2. The lower court went on the theory that plaintiff was under no legal duty to
enlist and having enlisted in reliance on defendant's offer, there was sufficient consid-
eration for promisor's offer. (Record, p. 142a).
3. Stelmack v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 339 Pa. 410, 14 A.2d 127 (1940) ; Jessup &
Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 283 Pa. 434, 129 Atl. 559 (1925) ; GRIsmoRE,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 53 (1947) ; Ashley, The Doctrine of Consid-
eration, 26 H.uv. L. Rav. 429 (1913).
4. Hillcrest Foundation, Inc. v. McFeaters, 332 Pa. 497, 2 A.2d 775 (1938);
Union Trust of Pitts. v. Long, 309 Pa. 470, 164 Atl. 346 (1932) ; York M. & Alloys
Co. v. Cyclops S. Co., 280 Pa. 585, 124 At. 752 (1924) ; Board of Foreign Missions
v. Smith, 209 Pa. 361, 58 Atl. 689 (1904); WILLIsTON, CONTRACTS § 102 (Rev. ed.
1936).
5. Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 569, 161 Atl. 571 (1932), rev'd
on other grounds, 318 Pa. 490, 178 Atl. 490 (1935); Dundas v. Sterling, 4 Pa. 73
(1846) ; Sidwell v. Evans, 1 P. & W. 383 (Pa. 1830) ; Johnes v. Potter, 5 S. & R. 519
(Pa. 1820).
6. In Mr. Justice Holmes' words, "... the promise and the consideration must
purport to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at least in part." Wisconsin
& Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903); Sidwell v. Evans, supra;
Mollet v. Fonsera, 4 S. & R. 543 (Pa. 1818). But cf. Langer v. Superior Steel Corp.,
.supra.
7. Clark v. Russel, 3 Watts 213 (Pa. 1834).
8. Stelmack v. Glen Alden Coal Co., supra (promise to repair plaintiff's build-
ing was held to be gratuitous) ; Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (promise to
furnish sister-in-law a home if she would give up the place she then had and move
to the promisor's domicile, held no consideration) ; WI.LISToN,CoNTaCTS § 112 (Rev.
ed. 1936).
9. Some English courts have in the same factual situation as that existing in the
instant case held that there was consideration, but in those situations there was actual
forbearance proven on the part of the employees. Shipton v. Cardiff Corp., 87 L.J.K.B.
51 (1917) ; Davies v. Rhondda District Urban Council, 87 L.J.K.B. 166 (1917) ; Bud-
gett v. Stratford Cooperative & Industrial Society, Ltd., 32 Times Law Rep. 378 (K.B.
1916).
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in the creation of better employee relations. Prima facie this appears to be
a benefit conferred on the promisor and hence, within the "legal benefit-
legal detriment" theory of consideration. But, upon a careful analysis of
the instant factual situation, it will be observed that the promisor is, in fact,
creating his own benefit, and this cannot be thought of as a legal benefit
since the doctrine demands that the benefit received by the promisor must
be conferred on him by the promisee in order to constitute a valid con-
sideration.10 The court based its decision primarily on plaintiff's forbear-
ance in refraining from getting a high paying war job. However, where
forbearance to exercise a legal right is the consideration, the burden is upon
the one relying on the forbearance to show by clear and satisfactory proof
that the request to forbear was in fact the inducing cause of the act of
forbearance.'" In the instant case, from an examination of the record,
there is at no point a showing, or even an inference, that the request to
forbear was the motivation of plaintiff's action or inaction. The court
found forbearance as consideration simply by implying it from the existing
factual situation. This result marks a deep inroad in the basic doctrine
of consideration, since it appears that it is no longer necessary to have any
evidence to indicate that there was actual forbearance bargained for and
given as the agreed exchange in order for there to be an enforcible promise.
Corporations-Enforcement at Face Value of Obligations of an
Insolvent Corporation Purchased at Discount by Directors-While a
corporation was technically insolvent but still a "going concern," respond-
ents, wife and mother of a director, made purchases of outstanding un-
matured debentures of the corporation at substantial discounts. The pur-
chases were made through the director as agent and solely on his advice.
In subsequent bankruptcy proceedings the referee allowed the claim at face
value. Petitioner, the indenture trustee, objected to an allowance of more
than the discounted price paid for the debentures. The decisions of the
district 1 and circuit 2 courts upholding the referee's ruling were affirmed
on the ground that the conduct of the director in the transaction was un-
objectionable.3 Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker et al., 338 U.S. 304
(1949).4
A trustee may not purchase a debt of the trust estate and make a profit
for himself because his personal status as creditor conflicts with his duty
to the beneficiaries. 5 Since a similar conflict arises with respect to a di-
rector's purchase of corporate obligations at a discount, it appears that an
analogous prohibition would be imposed on him.6 Nevertheless, a director
10. Briggs v. Miller, 176 Wis. 321, 186 N.W. 163 (1922) ; WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS
§ 102A (Rev. ed. 1936).
11. Schroyer v. Thompson, 262 Pa. 282, 105 Atl. 274 (1918) ; RESTAT MENT, CON-
TRAcTs § 55 (1932).
1. In re Calton Crescent, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
2. It re Calton Crescent, Inc., 173 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1949) (Judge Learned Hand
dissented), 62 HARv. L. REv. 1391 (1949).
3. Since the director was agent of respondents, any impropriety on his part would
affect their rights.
4. Justices Burton and Black dissented and agreed with the reasoning of the dis-
sent in the circuit court, see note 2 mzpra.
5. Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106 (1914).
6. The courts insist on a standard of loyalty for fiduciaries which will prevent
conflicts of interest from arising. Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Products Co., 19 F.2d
24 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 564 (1927).
752 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98
who purchases claims at a discount when his corporation is solvent is per-
mitted to enforce them in full in the absence of a breach of trust.
7 On the
other hand, if the purchase is made when the corporation is insolvent, the
general rule as advanced by the text writers is that a director may recover
no more than the price he paid for the debt.8  But the cases which have
limited recovery indicate that the insolvency of the corporation may not
have been the decisive factor. In each case there existed conduct of a di-
rector which the court regarded as detrimental to the interests of the cor-
poration or its creditors,9 a situation which justifies similar decisions when
the corporation is solvent at the time of purchase. However, insolvency
imposes a stricter standard of responsibility on the director.'0 The instant
decision appears to establish a new generalization applicable whether pur-
chases are made from a solvent or insolvent corporation. Thus, claims of
a director will be limited only when his conduct fails to conform to a stand-
ard which aims at minimizing conflicts of corporate and personal interests."
A corporation may improve its solvency status by purchasing its out-
standing obligations at a discount. Such transactions would improve the
credit position of the corporation; the remaining creditors would benefit by
the additional assets made available to meet their claims.' 2 So great is
the potential advantage that it should be the duty of a director to acquire
the obligations for the corporation even if necessary to borrow funds for
the purpose.' 3 An insolvent corporation might have difficulty in obtain-
ing cash, but if its fixed assets can be mortgaged, that course should be
pursued.' 4 In fact, the reduction of liabilities by the purchase may bring
7. Seymour v. Spring Forest Cemetery Ass'n, 144 N.Y. 333 39 N.E. 365 (1895) ;
see Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725, 728 (10th Cir. 1943) ; In re Phila. & Western
Ry. Co., 64 F. Supp. 738, 739 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ; In re McCrory Stores Corp., 12 F.
Supp. 267, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). See 3 FLETCHER, CvcLoPaniA OF CORPORATIONS § 869
(1947). The scope of this comment precludes any discussion of this rule which the
Court and the parties accepted as prevailing law. Justice Douglas' decision in Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) indicates the rigid fiduciary standard of conduct im-
posed on directors.
8. 3 FLETcHER, CYcLoPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 869.1 (1947).
9. E.g., Pepper v. Litton, supra (fraud) ; Monroe v. Scofield, supra (purchase
after bankruptcy permitted only by order of court) ; In re Van Swirengen Co., 119
F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied mb. nom. Terminal and Shaker Heights Realty
Co. v. Van Swirengen, 314 U.S. 671 (1941) (bad faith); In re Norcor Mfg.
Co., 109 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1940) (purchase after bankruptcy permitted only by order
of court) ; In re Phila. & Western Ry. Co., supra (director holding office pending re-
organization is equivalent to trustee in bankruptcy) ; In re Jersey Materials Co., 50 F.
Supp 428 (D.C. N.J. 1943) (directors acted on inside information) ; In re Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co., 46 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (inside information); In re
McCrory Stores Corp., supra (competition with corporation in making purchases).
10. A director is obligated to inform the creditor-vendor if liquidation is con-
templated or imminent. Manifestly, with this information the creditor would be
unwilling to sell his claim for less than it would bring upon liquidation. The minority
in the instant case desired to remand the cause to determine whether there was suffi-
cient prospect of liquidation at the time of the purchases to impose the duty to inform
the vendors.
11. See note 6 supra.
12. In the instant case, if the debentures had been purchased for the corporation
the remaining bondholders would have received 75o of the principal amount of the
debts instead of 43%. However, holders of current liabilities might complain about the
reduction of cash available to meet their obligations.
13. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294
U.S. 709 (1934), rehearing denied, 294 U.S. 733 (1934).
14. The apartment house, representing the total fixed assets of the corporation in
the instant case, was mortgaged to approximately 75% of its value. To purchase
$98,000 of debentures it was necessary to raise only $8000, less than 4% of its value.
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an insolvent corporation into solvency. On the other hand, although
solvent, the current asset position of a corporation may force it to borrow
funds. Thus, the duty of a director depends not on the solvency or in-
solvency of the corporation, but rather on the feasability of its raising the
required money. Therefore, if a director purchases obligations at a dis-
count on his own behalf, he should be required to negate this presumptive
breach of duty by proving the inability or inadvisability of the corpora-
tion's making the purchase. But the Court gave no indication that it con-
sidered this aspect of a director's duty when it concluded that the conduct
of the director in the instant case was unobjectionable. 15
Corporations-Shareholder's Action to Compel Payment of Divi-
dend-Directors as Indispensable Parties-The defendant, a Delaware
Corporation, was controlled by four of its common shareholders, who were
also its principal customers.1 In addition to the common shares there was
outstanding a large and widely held issue of cumulative preferred shares.
The corporate net earnings were substantial, and its financial condition
excellent,2 but for a number of years no dividends had been paid. Ap-
parently the earnings were being retained in the business to finance an
expansion of production facilities in order to assure the four principal
common shareholders an adequate supply of the Company's products. The
plaintiff, owner of 120 preferred shares, alleging that under these circum-
stances the refusal of the directors to declare a dividend was arbitrary and
unreasonable, brought an action in the federal courts to compel the cor-
poration to pay a dividend on the preferred shares. The corporation and
three of its directors were made parties. Nine other directors were not
before the court because they resided outside the jurisdiction and refused
to appear voluntarily. The trial court thought that a majority of the cor-
poration's directors were necessary parties, and on motion of the defend-
ants dismissed the complaint.3 On appeal, the court of appeals, reversing
the judgment, held that a shareholder may maintain an action to compel
the payment of a dividend even though he is unable to join as parties a
majority of the corporation's directors. Kroese v. General Steel Castings
Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1950).
Ordinarily corporate directors are given almost unlimited discretion
as to whether net earnings shall be distributed to shareholders or be re-
tained in the business.4 This discretion applies to cumulative preferred
15. The facts brought out in the opinion appear to justify a finding that it was
both wise and practical for the director to purchase the debentures for the corporation.
See notes 12 and 14 supra.
1. These shareholders, and the percentage of common stock held by each were:
American Steel Foundries, 38%; Baldwin Locomotive, 32%; American Locomotive,
13%; Pullman, Inc., 8%.
2. From 1940 through 1947 net profits totalled $18,278,617. Net worth on Dec.
31, 1947 was $28,000,105, and earned surplus was $13,410,080. There were 456,576
no-par common shares, and 100,000 $6 cumulative preferred shares outstanding. Divi-
dend arrearages on the preferred stock amounted to $5,850,000 ($57 per share). There
were "net current assets" of $12,114,409, and a ratio of current assets to current lia-
bilities of 7 to 1.
3. 9 F.R.D. 273 (E.D. Pa. 1949). Whether the facts alleged would warrant a
court in compelling the payment of a dividend was not decided or discussed, but the
court of appeals stated that if the allegations of the complaint were true, the plaintiff
would be entitled to relief. Instant case at 763.
4. 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5325 (Perm. ed. 1932); Frey, The
Distribution of Corporate Dividends, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 735, 736 (1941).
1950]
754 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98
as well as to non-cumulative preferred and to common shares.5 Accord-
ingly, as long as directors exercise an honest business judgment in estab-
lishing a dividend policy, courts will not interfere. But where the refusal
to declare a dividend is shown to be arbitrary, lacking in good faith, or for
the purpose of benefiting some participants in the enterprise at the expense
of others, a court may order the payment of a'dividend. 6 Without exten-
sive consideration, courts and text writers have frequently stated that a
majority of the directors must be joined as defendants in any action to
compel such a payment.7 The idea behind this "rule" is relatively simple;
only directors can declare a dividend, so if directors are not personally be-
fore the court there is no way of making the decree of the court effective.
The frequency of dicta declaring the "rule" is perhaps explainable by its
seeming reasonableness. Upon analysis, however, it will be seen that while
directors are proper parties, they are not indispensable. A party is usually
considered indispensable only when his interest is such that a final decree
cannot be entered without affecting him personally.8 Where a corporation
is ordered to pay a dividend, no relief is sought from the directors as in-
dividuals and they are therefore not indispensable in this usual sense. The
instant case is the first to make such a thorough analysis, and to permit
an action of this kind to proceed where the failure to join a majority of
the directors was objected to by the corporation. 9
5. BALLENMZE, CoRPoPATioNs § 232 (Rev. ed. 1946) ; Frey, supra note 4, at 737;
Note, 133 A.L.R. 653 (1940). There may be a charter or contractual provision which
will take away the director's discretion. E.g., Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 315
Mass. 397, 53 N.E.2d 230 (1944); New England Trust Co. v. Penobscot Chemical
Fibre Co., 50 A.2d 188 (Me 1946). But such provisions are rare.
6. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) ; FETCHER,
op. cit. spra note 4, § 5325, at 799; DODD AND BAKER, CASES AND MATEBIALS ON Busi-
NESS AssN. 1199 (1940) ; BALLENTINE, op. Cit. supra note 5, § 232; Frey, supra note 4,
at 737; Note, Shareholder's Right to Compel the Declaration of a Dividend, 10 RocKY
MT. L. REv. 201 (1937).
7. Texts and treatises almost all state that directors must be joined as defendants.
See, e.g., 11 FLETccHEi, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5326, p. 816; 13 A~mcAN JUIuspRu-
DENcE, § 12 (1938) ; BALLENTINE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 234. Cf. DODD AND BAKER,
op. cit. supra note 6, at § 653 (1946). But inasmuch as a majority of the directors
were joined as parties in nearly all of the reported cases, there are few decisions on
this point. Only four prior cases have been found in which the failure to join a ma-
jority of the directors was in issue. W. Q. O'Neal Co. v. O'Neal, 108 Ind. App. 116,
25 N.E.2d 656 (1940) (action sustained where closely held corporation was controlled
by the president, who was a party, and defendants did not object to failure to join a
majority of directors in trial court); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 230 App.
Div. 694, 246 N.Y. Supp. 204 (3d Dept. 1930) (directors held necessary parties; but
it did not appear that a majority of the directors resided beyond the jurisdiction) ;
Gesell v. Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Wis. 537, 552, 554, 555, 200 N.W. 550, 555, 556
(1924) (failure to join directors one of two grounds upon which dismissal of action
turned) ; Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1948) (action dismissed
where impossible to join a majority of directors), 61 HARv. L. REv. 1253. However,
there are numerous dicta to the effect that such an action cannot be maintained if di-
rectors are not before the court. E.g., see Kales v. Woodworth, 32 F.2d 37, 39 (6th
Cir. 1929); N.Y., Pa., N.J. Utilities v. Public S. Comm., 23 F. Supp. 313, 314
(S.D.N.Y. 1938) ; Green v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 329 Pa. 169, 174, 196 At. 32, 34
(1938).
8. "A arty is indispensable when he has such an interest that a final decree cannot
be made without affecting it, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that the final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience." Fineman
v. Cutler, 23 Pa. 189, 193, 116 AtL. 819, 820 (1922). Cf. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How.
130, 139 (U.S. 1854). See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b) ; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTiCE 2150
(2d ed. 1948) ; 3 OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 309 (1948).
9. Cases cited note 7, supra. The Schuckinan, case discussed the question, and
concluded that directors are indispensable parties; but the court did not, in its opinion
at least, examine the reasons for, and the soundness of, the rule.
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If the court finds that a dividend should be paid, it will usually deter-
mine both the amount and the time of payment.'0 The directors, there-
fore, are not called upon to exercise any business discretion after the decree
has been entered. Under these circumstances the "declaration" to be made
by the directors is at most a ministerial act performed solely for the pur-
pose of conforming the procedure to the requirements of the general cor-
poration law of the state." If this ministerial act can be compelled by per-
sonal jurisdiction over a majority of the directors, as is generally con-
ceded,' 2 there would seem to be no reason why the court should not compel
a dividend distribution in an appropriate case by any means at its com-
mand. Courts of equity can achieve by indirection that which they can-
not order directly. In the instant case the court suggests that if the di-
rectors should fail to comply with a decree binding only on the corporation,
a receivership or sequestration of the corporation's property should produce
the requisite action.' 3 The federal rules envisage such relief,1 4 and the
state courts are equally adept at reaching a desired result beyond their
power to command by the imposition of an onerous alternative.15 Of
course, where a majority of the directors can be served without undue
difficulty, a court may properly insist thereon, because of the greater ease
with which the decree can be enforced. But where, as in the instant case,
less than half of the directors reside in any one jurisdiction, to insist that
a majority of the directors be joined as parties is in effect to deny any relief
whatever. The denial of a right to redress a legal wrong should not rest
upon so flimsy a foundation as the ease with which a decree of the court
can be enforced. The court properly concluded, therefore, that while it
may be convenient to join directors as parties, there is no necessity.
Evidence-Admissibility of Suicide Note Inculpating the Defend-
ant as a Declaration Against Interest-After a conviction for inten-
tionally making false entries in a city tax ledger, the defendant was granted
a new trial on the ground that a suicide note of another inculpating him had
been erroneously admitted. The note, which was offered to show the de-
fendant's motive in making the false entries, stated that the author and the
accused had each received portions of certain embezzled tax funds. On
appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the order, ruling that the note was
hearsay and did not come within the exception of a declaration against
interest. Commonwealth v. Antonini, 69 A.2d 436 (Pa. Super. 1949).
10. E.g., in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., siopra, the court held that a dividend of
$19,275,385 should be paid. In Channon v. Channon Co., 218 Ill. App. 397 (1920),
the decree ordered the payment of a 10% dividend.
11. General corporation laws usually provide that dividends may be declared only
by the directors. See, e.g., DEL. REv. CODE §§ 2066, 2067 (1935) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 2852-701 (Purdon, 1938).
12. See note 6, mupra.
13. Instant case at 764. It has also been suggested that a decree be entered
against those parties before the court, and enforcement be held in abeyance pending
the bringing of similar actions in other jurisdictions. Schuckman v. Rubenstein, supra,
at 958, 61 HA~v. L. REv. 1253, 1254 (1948). But the multiple suits that the applica-
tion of this suggestion would engender would be undesirable.
14. FnD. R. Crv. P. 70. "If . . . the party fails to comply within the time speci-
fied, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by
some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done has like effect as
if done by the party."
15. E.g., Philadelphia Baseball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 Atl. 973 (1902).
Cf. Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G. M. & J. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852). See The
Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 792, 803, 811, 813 (9th Cir. 1909) ; Cunliffe v. Consumers
Ass'n., 280 Pa. 263, 124 Atl. 501 (1924).
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Statements made by a person not under oath nor subject to cross-
examination are labeled hearsay and inadmissible, if the relevancy of the
statement depends on its veracity.1 But numerous well defined exceptions
admit certain hearsay statements which experience has shown more likely
to be trustworthy because of the circumstances under which they made.
2
Among these well established exceptions is one that sanctions the admis-
sion of statements by third persons of facts which are adverse to their
interest. The cases state that admissibility of declarations in this category
requires the declarant to be unavailable, that the statement be against his
pecuniary or proprietary interest, that there be a consciousness of this ad-
verse interest, and finally there be an absence of a motive to falsify.3 These
requirements do not represent a completely rigid standard, but do reflect
majority views. Some advocate that penal liability should be added to
pecuniary and proprietary interests as an adverse interest under this excep-
tion.4 But assuming this, reason dictates that a penal interest should be in-
effective when the declaration immediately precedes a suicide, since the
declarant will soon be beyond criminal liability. Moreover, the majority
in Anglo-American law rejects penal interest as sufficient adverse interest
under the exception.5 On the other hand, in cases of a declarant's admit-
ting a theft or misappropriation of money, courts have allowed the note
in evidence because the facts created a pecuniary liability, probably on
the theory that one would not make unfounded statements that might
affect his estate.6 Frequently the adverse facts have no relevancy to any
issue in the case, but the declaration is offered to prove other facts con-
tained in collateral statements connected with the disserving statements.
Some collateral statements may be designated as neutral in character, being
neither self-serving or disserving to the declarant. Declarations containing
such neutral statements are usually admitted.7 However, where the addi-
tional facts were favorable to the declarant or self-serving when made, the
courts are split as to the admission of such complete statements. Some
object to the admission of the self-serving portion,s while Wigmore sug-
gests that the whole declaration should be admitted because the self-serving
statement is influenced or affected by the trustworthy frame of mind which
permitted the declarant to state what was against his interest.9 In the
instant case the court, in apparently creating a third category of collateral
statements, stated that where the additional facts had the effect of incul-
pating someone, the full declaration would not be admissible against that
person in a criminal prosecution.
1. 5 WiGiomE, EVIDENcE § 1362 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Ibid. §§ 1420-1426.
3. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
58 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1944).
4. See United States v. Donnelly, 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913) (dissenting opinion);
5 WIGMORE, EVmENcE § 1476 (3d ed. 1940).
5. See Morgan, Declarations Against Interest in Texas, 10 TEx. L. Rv. 399, 409
(1910).
6. Scott County v. Fluke, 34 Iowa 317 (1872) ; Truelsch v. Miller, 186 Wis. 239,
202 N.W. 352 (1925).
7. Turner v. Turner, 123 Ga. 5, 50 S.E. 969 (1905); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Strauch, 179 Okla. 617, 67 P.2d 452 (1937).
8. Putnam v. Lincolin Safe Deposit Co., 87 App. Div. 13, 83 N.Y. Supp. 1091
(3d Dept. 1903); Doe d. Kinglake v. Beviss, 7 C.B. 456, 137 Eng. Rep. 181 (C.P.
1849); Knight v. Marquess of Waterford, 44 C.C.C. 283, 160 Eng. Rep. 1013 (Ex.
1839).
9. 5 WiGmo, O  EVIDENCE § 1465 (3d ed. 1940). See also MODEL CODE OF Evi-
DENcE, Rule 509, comment b (1942).
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The problem in the instant case appears to be a novel one. The court
refused admission of the note as a confession of a co-conspirator, 10 as a
dying declaration," and held finally that it could not be admitted as a decla-
ration against interest because it inculpated the defendant. As regards the
latter, the court reasoned that since the Supreme Court in United States
v. Donnelly'2 had excluded a suicide note admitting the guilt of the de-
clarant thus exonerating the defendant in that case, a similar statement that
has an inculpatory effect should not be admitted as a declaration against
interest. Such an analogy overlooks the fact that the declaration in the
Donnelly case was only adverse to a penal interest. The true issue for a
court where evidence is offered as a declaration against interest, as in other
exceptions to the hearsay rule, is to determine whether such statements are
trustworthy so that the jury may hear them and weigh their credibility.' 3
In this case the declarant's estate is liable not for a portion, but for the
whole amount embezzled and consequently the part of the statement in-
culpating the accused cannot be labeled self-serving, but only neutral in
nature.14 Therefore if it appears to the court that the whole declaration
is trustworthy because of the circumstances under which the declarant
published the adverse facts, then it should allow introduction of the note.
It is submitted that the trustvorthiness of the note should not be affected
by the fact that it is offered in a criminal suit rather than a civil case. Nor
does it seem wise to say that its trustworthiness should be affected by the
fact that the note is used to inculpate a defendant rather than exculpate
one, for it seems doubtful that the writer would anticipate the situation in
which his note would be offered in testimony. It appears in the present
case that the court is not interested in appraising the trustworthiness of
note to determine its admissibility, but rather in invoking some form of
privilege which it seems to feel exists for defendants in criminal prose-
cutions.
Income Taxation-Depreciation Basis of Community-Donated
Property-Valley Industries, Inc., a community organization of Sayre,
Pennsylvania, in order to attract industry to Sayre during the depression
agreed to convey to the taxpayer land and a factory building purchased
by Valley with funds pledged by prospective employees if the taxpayer
moved its operations from Lebanon, Pennsylvania to Sayre and paid
$5,000,000 in pay roll. When it became certain that the taxpayer would
remain in Sayre, the payroll requirement was waived and title was con-
veyed. The corporation paid no income taxes for the contributed prop-
erty. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed use of the cost
of the building to Valley as petitioner's basis in computing a depreciation
deduction for the plant. The Court of Appeals, reversing the Tax Court's
10. The court stated that a confession of a co-conspirator is inadmissible against
the other conspirator because the note was written at a time when the conspiracy is
at an end. Instant case at 438.
11. A dying declaration is admissible only when made by the victim of a homicide
and which names the cause of his death.
12. United States v. Donnelly, supra.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. A joint-tortfeasor is liable for all money embezzled. RESTATEmENT, ToRTs
§ 879 (1934). A tortfeasor is barred from contribution from the other joint-tort-
feasor where his conduct involved a seriously wrongful act. RESTATEMENT, RzSTrrU-
nox § 88 (1937). The estate of the declarant in the instant case has already been
subjected to liability by the city for the embezzled funds. City of Philadelphia v. May
Foss et al., 65 Pa. D. & C. 401 (1949).
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affirmance of the Commissioner's deficiency assessment,1 held that the con-
veyance was both a "gift" and "contribution to capital" which entitled
petitioner to use a substituted basis to compute depreciation. Commis-
stoner v. McKay Products Corporation, 178 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1949).
As provided in the Internal Revenue Code, the capital sum which may
be recouped by depreciation allowances is the cost of the asset unless it was
received as a "gift" or "contribution to capital." 2 In the latter event, the
taxpayer's basis is the cost to the donor or transferor.8 What constitutes
a gift or contribution to capital within the scope of those provisions is not
settled. Unlike the gift and estate tax statutes,4 no explanation of the
meaning of gift is to be found in the income tax law or regulations. The
Supreme Court, however, has said that a gift for income tax purposes
is the giving of something for nothing with a donative intent as distin-
guished from the motive or reason which prompted the transfer.5 Thus,
the forgiving of a debt to keep a customer,6 and the cancellation of a rental
indebtedness while negotiating a new lease 7 have been held to constitute
gifts. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Edwards v. Cuba Rail-
road Co.8 characterized subsidies by Cuba to a New Jersey corporation to
induce construction of a railroad in that Republic as contributions to capital
which, although not gifts, were not taxable income. On the basis of that
decision contributions by shippers to railroads to defray the cost of con-
structing spur tracks, 9 by consumers to induce the extension of electric
power lines to their locale,' 0 by local community groups to induce new
industry to settle in their community 11 likewise have been held not to
constitute taxable income. Until the advent of Detroit Edison Co. v. Com-
missioner,12 however, the question whether assets so acquired were gifts
or contributions to capital for depreciation purposes apparently has not
been argued -or has been circumvented by the courts.', The Supreme
Court in the latter case held that utility line extensions paid for by prospec-
tive customers as a prerequisite to obtaining service were neither gifts nor
1. McKay Products Corporation v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 1082 (1947).
2. For other bases of depreciation not here pertinent see INT. REv. CODE 113(a)
et seq.
3. IxT. REv. CoDE §§23(e), 113(a) (2), 113(a) (8) (B).
4. INT. REv. CODE §§ 811(c), 1002. A gift as therein defined includes all trans-
fers for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
5. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 331 (1943).
6. Liberty Mirror Works v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1018 (1944).
7. Helvering v. American Dental Co., wpra.
8. 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
9. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 194 (1934); Great
Northern Railway Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 225 (1927), aff'd 40 F.2d 372 (8th
Cir. 1930).
"10. Tampa Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 1002 (1928) ; Appeal of Lib-
erty Light and Power Co., 4 B.T.A. 155 (1926).
11. Frank Holton and Co., 10 B.T.A. 1317 (1928); GCM 16952, 1937-1 Cubt.
Bum- 133 (1937) (nor are such contribution gifts for gift tax purposes, or, impliedly,
for income tax purposes).
12. 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
13. Presumably the recipients of contributed-property prior to the Detroit Edi-
son Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943) were permitted to use their transferor's
cost as their basis for depreciation purposes. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Commissioner,
supra. In Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 762 (4th Cir.
1942) money contributed by suppliers of slag to a concrete company to induce the
construction of a concrete plant at a particular location was said to be part of the
"cost" of the plant and therefore includible in the concrete corporation's basis of
depreciation. The above case was not followed in Commissioner v. Arundel-Brooks
Concrete Corp., 152 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1945) wherein the Court of Appeals held in
accord with Detroit Edison v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
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contributions to capital, and since the utility had not been taxed on the
contributions, the assets cost taxpayer nothing and could not be depreciated.
In reliance on the Detroit Edison case, under circumstances similar to the
present case, the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth 1 4 and Eighth '5 Circuits
held that depreciation deductions could not be taken for either community-
donated property or property purchased with community-contributed
money. Conceding conflict with those decisions, the instant court reasoned
that the transfer was a "contribution to capital" because it was part of the
taxpayer's capital assets and because the Regulations 16 make "it clear that
a contribution to capital for the purpose of Section 113 (a) (8) may come
from any person." 17 The Detroit Edison case was distinguished on the
ground that the contributions in that case were neither gifts nor contribu-
tions to capital because they were part of the price of services.
If the contributions in the instant case constituted gifts within the
exclusion provisions of the Code, they undoubtedly would also be gifts for
purposes of depreciation. Although consideration was present the court
in the instant case held that the transfer may be treated as a gift. In
addition the court decided that the transfer was also a contribution to
capital and, therefore, depreciation deductions were allowable. Both
grounds at most are tenuous. Rather than gifts, the contributions appear
to be the price of needed jobs and reality would seem to suggest the
absence of any donative intent on the part of the unemployed contributors.18
Nor can the contributions be said to be contributions to capital within the
meaning of the provisions in question. The purpose of depreciation deduc-
tions is to promote business continuity by permitting the recoupment of
capital risked in business and used in the production of income. The
present taxpayer made no investment and, therefore, should not be allowed
to recoup one. Unlike stockholders who contribute to a corporation's
paid-in surplus or capital, Valley had no proprietary interest in the tax-
payer nor would the depreciation deductions in any way accrue to its benefit.
The terms "contribution to capital" were added to section 113 (a) (8) to
close avenues of tax avoidance not to provide taxpayers with a means of
recouping an investment which they never made.1 9 As construed by the
present court the contributions in the Detroit Edison case would also be
14. C. L. Downey Co. v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 810 (4th Cir. 1949).
15. Commissioner v. Brown Shoe Co., 175 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1949).
16. "In respect of property acquired by a corporation . . . from a shareholder
as paid-in surplus, or from any person as a contribution to capital, the basis of the
property in the hands of the corporation is the basis which the property would have
had in the hands of the transferor if the transfer had not been made." (Italics ad-ded)
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.113(a) (8)-1 (1935).
17. 178 F.2d 639, 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1949).
18. "All . . . authorities agree . . . that to have a gift there must be a
donative intent on the part of the transferor." Sportswear Hosiery Mills v. Commis-
sioner, 129 F.2d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 1942). The absence of a donative intent would
seem to be evident from the circumstance that the pledgors did not have funds with
which to pay their pledges but instead authorized their prospective employers to de-
duct ten per cent from their pay to fulfill the pledge. Instant case at 644.
19. This section was amended to restore the Treasury rule that the basis of prop-
erty transferred to a corporation as paid-in surplus is the same as the basis of the
property to the transferor. The amendment was expressly enacted as a result of
Rosenbloom v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 763 (1931) which held that the fair market
value of the property at the date of transfer shall be the transferee's basis. At this
time the provision that the basis of property transferred to a corporation as a con-
tribution to capital should be the same as the basis in the hands of the transferor was
added. See SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAx LAws 455
(1938).
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"contributions to capital" 20 although the Supreme Court in that case ex-
pressly held otherwise. Although not expressed, the instant decision may
have been influenced by the public purpose for which the contributions
were made and recognition of the fact that if such contributions are to be
effective and attractive the corporation must have the full benefit of the
property given. Support for such factors perhaps can be found in the
Cuba Railroad case but that case is of doubtful vitality and did not involve
depreciation deductions. The present decision emphasizes the necessity
for a re-examination of the taxable nature of transactions such as those
here in question and, if taxable as was intimated in the Detroit Edison
case, the more preferable alternative of taxing the transfer and thereafter
permitting depreciation deductions to be taken.
Securities Acts-Holding Companies-Loss of "Substantial Econ-
omies" as Defense to Dissolution Order-The Philadelphia Company,
a public utility holding company controlling electric, natural gas, and urban
railway corporations in the Pittsburgh, Pa. area, was ordered to strip itself
of all holdings except those in "one integrated utility system" by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission in a proceeding under Section 11 (b) of
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.1 The company was
joined by its parent company, Standard Gas and Electric 2 in a petition in
the Circuit Court to review this order, claiming that the proposed dis-
solution would result in an annual loss to the operating companies of over
one million dollars. The Act provides that all holding companies are to
be restricted to the control of "one integrated utility system," except that
companies of reasonable size can retain other systems if separation would
cause the loss of "substantial economies." 3 The court dismissed the peti-
tion, stating that the statutory restriction on the Commission's action was
limited to cases in which such "substantial economies" were lost that the
operating companies were incapable of efficient, economically independent
existence. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
Public utility holding companies played a leading role in the some-
what ribald finance of the late "twenties" and when the boom collapsed
bankruptcy claimed all but the firmest of them. Their structures had be-
come so complex that small investors were hood-winked into supplying
the substance of huge capital pools which promoters controlled by relatively
minimal investment for spectacular personal profit. Moreover, their geo-
20. In view of the fact that the present court, in reliance on language in the Regu-
lations, .rpra, expressly stated that the source of contributions is immaterial, its pur-
ported distinction of the transfer in the Detroit Edison case, supra, on the ground that
they were there received from customers as part of the price of services would seem
to be without substance.
1. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1946).
2. Standard Gas and Electric and its parent Company, Standard Power and Light
have been involved in similar proceedings with the SEC: Standard Power and Light
Co., 9 S.E.C. 882 (1941); Standard Power and Light Co., 11 S.E.C. 689 (1942).
3. Section 11 of the so-called "death sentence" section. It requires all registered
public utility holding companies to obey orders of the SEC directing limitation of hold-
ing company systems to a "single integrated public utility system, and to such other
businesses as are reasonably incidental . . .; Provided, however, that the Commission
shall permit a registered holding company to continue to control one or more additional
integrated public utility systems if it finds . . . that (A) the additional system can-
not be operated as an independent system without the loss of substantial- economies";
(B) demands geographictl integration; and, (C) places a general limitation on fiscal
size. 49 STAT. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(a)(1) (1946).
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graphical extent preserved these financial Hydras from state utility regula-
tion. So much public ire was stirred when misfortune forced the unveiling
of these unsavory combines that the Democratic party platform of 1932
pledged to destroy them. Pursuant to this promise the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 was passed after months of dispute within
and between the houses of Congress. The Act was designed to obviate the
principal evils of these structures by empowering the SEC to order their
simplification and limitation to one "integrated utility system." 4 That
some inequities were bound to result was well known,5 but the adminis-
tration's opponents were satisfied that the "substantial economies" excep-
tion would mitigate the Act's severity.6 Indeed, the Senate and the ad-
ministration feared that its inclusion would vitiate the whole bill,7 but the
SEC and the courts allayed such anxiety by interpreting away its ap-
plicability whenever it couldn't be ignored.8 It is certain that economies
to the companies' stockholders are not to be considered.9 The courts have
also demanded that the company show itself to be of controllable size before
it could even raise the question of exception.' 0 Although the plain meaning
of the words indicates that savings in operating expenses are to control,
such savings have been held insufficient." The meaning of the word
"economies" has been extended to embrace collateral beneficial effects
which are thus available to counter-balance any lost savings.' 2  The courts
have claimed that such interpretation is the force of the general policy of
the Act as it is exerted by the words of the exception.1 3 The instant deci-
4. BARNES, THE EcoNomIcS OF PuBLic UTnITY RiEGuLATiON 671 (1942).
5. Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign. Commerce,
pt. 1, H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 217 (1935). The holding companies objected
to every word of the bill, they felt that their right to sound investment planning was
being abridged by this incursion on free portfolio diversification.
6. The original Senate bill fostered by the late Burton K. Wheeler demanded
absolute and present dismemberment, Hearings before the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1935). The House bill
was substantially different, the dismemberment was to be postponed indefinitely if it
would result in harm to the "investors or the public interest," Hearings before the
House Committee, supra note 5, at 367. The present statute was the result of a com-
promise between the houses-the "Barkley Compromise." 79 CONG. REc. 14164
(1935).
7. 79 CONG. IEC. 14168-14172 (1935). However, the legislators were well aware
that most holding companies could show some saving to consumers by combined opera-
tions, Hearings before the House Committee, supra note 5, pt. 2, 1249, 1402, 1530. It
was therefore obvious that "substantial economies" were considered to be somewhat
more than those the Companies had shown at the legislative hearings.
8. In practice the satisfaction of the Proviso has been extremely elusive, e.g.,
North American Co., 11 S.E.C. 194 (1942); Memorandum of Public Utility Ditsion
to Commission, CCH FED. SEC. LAw RFP. i 75,123 (SEC 1941).
9. In North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 708 (1946) the Court found
that the investors' right to pool capital and gain economies of centralized management
by the holding company device was weighed by Congress against its actual and poten-
tial lamage to the public and the latter concern was adjudged the more worthy of
protection.
10. That is, that all three provisions, (A), (B), and (C) in note 3, supra, of the
exception must be satisfied to qualify, United Public Utilities Corp., 11 S.E.C. 33
(1942).
11. A general saving which might inhere in the combined operation of two simi-
lar and related, but not jointly operated, businesses does not satisfy the Proviso, En-
gineer's Public Service Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
12. As in the Engineer's case, note 11 supra, it was held that healthfully competing
management in the operating companies was a potential economy resulting from dis-
solution.
13. "Substantial economies" means important economies, and these are to be meas-
ured by the statutory policy in opposition to retention of multiple utility systems, North
American Co. v. SEC, 133 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1943).
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sion virtually invalidates any defense to the SEC's dissolution orders; and
to accomplish this it pursues an entirely new tack in interpreting the words
of the exception. Economies of combination are now only substantial when
without them the operating companies cannot exist as economically efficient
units.
Radical technological advances gave the first impetus to the holding
company system 14 but financiers soon utilized its versatile form to further
their own promotional schemes. 15 As long as the companies hold no more
than one integrated utility system their capital structures are relatively
evenly-balanced and simple while all the advantages of relaxed competition
are obtained. Once, however, the distance between the operating com-
panies and the real controllers becomes effective all the evil potentialities in
the system are given free rein,16 and grotesque chains of ownership string
out like that which once held the Philadelphia Company.17 These facts
were in the minds of the proponents of the 1935 Act and there is no doubt
that they were seeking an absolute ban on these destructive practices.1s
But the statute that was enacted was not absolute in its terms; it was the
product of laborious compromise.19 That compromise has been studiously
ignored by the courts, thus effectively enacting a bill which, without amend-
ment, could not gain legislative sanction.02
Trade Regulation-Constitutionality of Statute Providing Mini-
mum Prices for Retail Liquor Sales-A Louisiana statute required
that retailers who sold liquor for off-premise consumption and whole-
salers mark up certain alcoholic beverages a minimum percentage over
cost.' After violation of the statute by selling at a lower price, the petition-
ing retailer sought an injunction against enforcement of an order by the
state board of control suspending its selling permit. In affirming the lower
14. BARNES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 80 et seq. Holders of early appliance patents
couldn't capitalize on them because no power companies existed to supply the neces-
sary energy to operate the utensils they produced. To forge the missing link these
manufacturers financed utility service companies.
15. The FTC found nineteen distinct and grievous abuses of the holding company
structure, UTnrry CoRPoRATIONS, SummaRY REPr., SEN. Doc. 92, Part 72-A, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
16. STni, GOVERNMENT AND THE INVESTOR 169 (1941). For an interesting study
indicating that efficiency is not a concomitant of concentration, see RmLAT=IV EFrI-
CIENCY OF BusiNEss 95 (TNEC, Monograph 13, 1940); for a statistical refutation
of that position, see Waterman, Economic Implications of Public Utility Holding
Company Operations, IX MIcEI. Bus. STUDIEs, No. 5 (1941).
17. See SEC, REPORT ON INVESTrMENT TRusTS, pt. V, 54 et seq., for the history
of this combine. The Philadelphia Co. was a holding company held by Standard Gas
and Electric Co., which was held by Standard Power and Light Co., which was held
by United States Electric Power Co. This charade was terminated by the first cold
wind of the stock market break in 1929, since then the courts have been sorting out
the remains. Cf. DisTmmurioNr OF OwNzRsnn', 1202, 1316 (TMEC Monograph 29,
1940).
18. Senator Wheeler said in the Senate, the Act's "spirit is that of a tax on big-
ness. It marks a return to economic democracy."
19. 79 CONG. REc. 14166 et seq. (1935).
20. Aside from the interpretation problem, it is unwise for a court to announce
rules which so clearly point a new direction for government policy.
1. LA. GEN. STAT. §8782(a), (b) (Dart, 1939).
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court the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the mark-up provisions
deprived petitioner of a right without due process of law in violation of
the state and federal constitutions While the averred object of the
statute was to eliminate excessive consumption of strong drink resulting
from price wars, the provisions of this statute were not reasonably related
to this object since (1) manufacturers, excluded from its provisions, could
still sell without profit and foment a price war, (2) bar sales were like-
wise excluded, and (3) a drastic price war could hardly occur in Louisiana
since the Unfair Sales Act already prohibited the sale in the regular course
of business of any merchandise for a price less than cost. Schwegmann
Bros. v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 43 So.2d 248
(La. 1949).
A business is subject to regulation under the state police power when
there is a sufficient "public interest" involved to warrant its exercise, and
this includes the fixing of minimum prices if such action be necessary to
achieve the legislative aim.3 Indeed, the argument was advanced that
since a state can entirely suppress the liquor business, it can arbitrarily
regulate it,4 but this contention was rejected by the court holding that
even a partial regulation must be reasonable and subserve the policy of
protecting the public from the evils of drink.5 In the instant case the fix-
ing of high minimum prices to prevent excessive drinking of liquor pur-
chased for off-premise consumption was not a reasonable means of attain-
ing the legislative aim, since the real danger of immorality lay in sales
from unregulated bar rooms.6 It is apparent that there are more direct
means of limiting the consumption of alcohol. Rationing would be one
efficient solution; limiting the hours during which alcoholic beverages
could be sold would be another. Similarly, in a case involving the fixing
of minimum prices in the barber trade it was held that while regulation
might be necessary to protect the public health, more direct means could
be employed to minimize the transmission of disease than simply assur-
ing the barbers of a large enough return so as to be able to afford sani-
tation measures.7 To be distinguished are cases in which the price fixing
2. LA. CoxsT. Art. 1, § 2 (Dart, 1932) ; U.S. CoNsr. AimrN. XIV, § 1. Another
attack upon the statute listed but undiscussed in the majority opinion was that it per-
mitted an unlawful delegation of legislative power since manufacturers determined
cost to the wholesalers and thus had the power to fix minimum prices at which whole-
salers and retailers could sell. See LA. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 1 (Dart, 1932).
3. Businesses "affected with a public interest" are not a fixed class, but this phrase
means that an industry for adequate reason is subject to control for the public good.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
4. Cf. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
5. While the Supreme Court of the United States declared in the Crowley case
that there is no inherent right to sell liquor, it declared in a more recent case that
regulation of the liquor industry must be reasonable. Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132
(1939).
6. Instant case at 259.
7. Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark. 156, 161 S.W.2d 189 (1942). It had earlier been
declared by the Louisiana court that minimum price standards in the barber trade di-
rectly related to the public health. Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214,
182 So. 485 (1938). See also Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977 (1938).
But significantly where the minimum prices in the barber trade have been established
solely to alleviate unemployment in the trade and economic distress, and there has
been no attempt to relate them to public health, it has been declared that the statutes
are unconstitutional. City of Mobile v. Rouse, 233 Ala. 622, 173 So. 266 (1937);
Duncan v. City of Des Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 268 N.W. 547 (1936). However, in
two states the power to fix minimum charges for cleaning and dyeing service has
been held to exist although the business is neither a public utility nor is there any
averred relation to public health, morals or safety in such regulation. See Paulsen,
The Persistence of Substantive Die Process in the States, 34 MiNN. L. Rav. 91 (1950).
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prevents cut-throat competition and threatened destruction of an industry
which produces a product highly beneficial to the consuming public.s
The decision that a partial regulation of the liquor industry must be
reasonable even though policy would justify its destruction is appreciated
when it is realized that an opposite conclusion would mean there could
never be an unconstitutional regulation of the liquor traffic. In declaring
the regulation unreasonable in the principal case, the court was con-
fronted with the problem that often arises where minimum prices, in-
cluding a substantial profit, are fixed by law to protect a public interest.
The decision to be made is whether the benefits of such legislation are
outweighed by the fact that a particular group of merchants is assured
of high profits thereby depriving the public of the benefits of competition.
Nor should the efficient merchant in a competitive economy be deprived
of his right to contract freely if the primary intent and result is to benefit
a group of individuals at public expense. Another type of regulation
which limits competition and may result in excessive profits is the fair
trade act which permits contracts between a vendor of trade-marked goods
and his vendee as to the price to be charged by the vendee in the resale
of the product.9 Historically, statutes fixing minimum prices, including a
profit, were frequently resorted to during the depression years when a
disrupted economy, in which supply exceeded demand, required emergency
measures to prevent a descent of prices below conscionable levels.10 To-
day, however, when the supply-demand balance has been restored, govern-
ment sanction of price fixing above the cost appears unnecessary from the
viewpoint of public economic welfare. Such legislation should be closely
scrutinized when said to be connected with some other public interest
such as morality or health.
Unfair Competition-Power of Federal Trade Commission to
Proscribe Advertisement of Representations Contained in Letters-
Patent-Petitioners advertised that their patented device, Vacudex,
when attached to the exhaust of an automobile, saved tires; saved gasoline
and oil; eliminated or reduced back pressure; increased the power of
the motor, caused it to give better performance; drew carbon, oil, and
moisture from the muffler; reduced vibration of the motor; gave the motor
greater acceleration, and caused the motor to run more smoothly. The
Federal Trade Commission found these representations to be false and
deceptive and petitioners were ordered to cease disseminating them. The
proscribed representations were substantially the same as certain of the
assertions as to result incorporated in petitioners' letters-patent. On ap-
peal, petitioners attacked the power of the FTC, to forbid the advertise-
ment, contending that the findings of the FTC concerning their device
challenged the finding by the Patent Office that the device possessed
utility-in effect an attack on the validity of the patent, which may only be
done by the United States in appropriate proceedings before a federal
8. Nebbia v. New York, supra.
9. Such a statute stood the test of constitutional objection in Old Dearborn Co.
v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936), the Court reasoning that the seller has the
right to safeguard his good will which the buyer never owns. But such a statute has
recently been declared invalid in Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp.,
40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
10. See 98 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 129 (1949).
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district court.1 Affirming the order, the court held that the findings of the
FTC that petitioners had misrepresented certain results of their device
were compatible with a Patent Office finding that the invention possessed
utility, since there were other benefits asserted in the letters-patent which
were iot referred to by the FTC, any one of which, if found to exist,
would have been sufficient to justify the granting of the patent. Decker
v. Federal Trade Commission, 176 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. de-
nied, 338 U.S. 878 (1949).
To warrant the issuance of a patent, the result produced by an in-
vention must be a good one, capable of being so applied in the ordinary
affairs of life so as to prove advantageous, in contradistinction to a result
which is frivolous, pernicious, or wholly injurious. 2 To be "useful" within
the meaning of the patent statutes, 3 an invention must also be operative,
sx.., it must be capable of accomplishing the claimed beneficial result.4
A device is not operative if, while capable of accomplishing its purpose,
it will accomplish it only to such a restricted extent as to make its use
in industry prohibitive.5 Operativeness is determined by the application
of known scientific and engineering principles.6 However, the inventor
is not required by the statute to make the thing for which he applies for
a patent,7 and a reasonable doubt as to an invention's capacity to ac-
complish the result claimed for it is resolved in favor of the applicant,
whether a substantial reduction to practice is claimed, or the applicant
merely relies on the description." The Patent Office has the primary
duty of determining utility, and a presumption that the invention is use-
ful and operative arises from the issuance of a patent.9 Although the
record of the Patent Office proceedings was not before it, the court in
the instant case found the proceedings of the FTC did not constitute an
attack on the presumption of utility by assuming that the Patent Office
could have, and did find utility in any one of the assertions in the letters-
patent which were not referred to by the FTC.
Had the power of the FTC been denied, the Patent Office, in addi-
tion to finding the requisite utility, would be required to assume the
onerous duty of satisfying itself that every asserted benefit would actually
result before issuing a patent. This being manifestly an impossibility,
in the inevitable situation where some of the anticipated benefits failed of
realization, the patentee would then be entitled to misrepresent with im-
1. Original jurisdiction of any civil action relating to patents arising under any
Act of Congress is vested in the district courts, by 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1946). The
United States may obtain cancellation of a patent on the grounds of fraud or mistake,
United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888). For a dictum
that the United States may attack the validity of a patent in an action to restrain
alleged violations of the Sherman Act through licensing arrangements, see United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 386-388 (1948).
2. See, e.g., Hall v. Duart Sales Co., 28 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. 11. 1939) ; Lowell
v. Lewis, 15 Fed. Cas. 1018, No. 8,568 (C.C. Mass. 1817).
3. The pertinent statutes are, 16 STAT. 201, 15 U.S.C. § 31, and 16 STAT. 202, 15
U.S.C. § 36 (1946).
4. E.g., In re Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1940) ; In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d
965 (C.C.P.A. 1931). See, in general, 1 WALCER, PATENTS §§ 64, 65 (Deller's edi-
tion, 1937).
5. Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 71 F.2d 539, 543 (8th Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 625 (1934).
6. In re Cushman, 6 Fed. Cas. 1066, No. 3,513 (D.C. Cir. 1858).
7. See Berry v. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp., 29 F. Supp. 516, 521 (E.D.
Mich. 1939).
8. In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965 (C.C.P.A. 1931) ; Ex parte DeBausset, 1888 Dec.
Comm'r Pat. 66 (1888).
9. See Callison v. Dean, 70 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1934); Cleveland Automatic Ma-
chine Co. v. National Acme Co., 52 F.2d 769, 770 (6th Cir. 1931).
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punity so far as the Federal government was concerned. However, on
the grounds put, an inference remains that in the future should the FTC
ban all assertions as to results, such action would be beyond the legisfa-
tive mandate. The FTC has the power to enjoin advertising which has
a capacity and tendency to deceive the average non-expert to which such
advertising is directed. 10 The issue treated was whether the FTC's ac-
tion fell outside the scope of the power delegated to it by Congress. But,
the issue presented would appear to be whether the FTC is concluded or
estopped in any manner by the Patent Office's finding of utility. In this
case of first impression, a holding is to be desired which would have
squarely disposed of this issue. It is a matter of common knowledge that
the Commissioner of Patents does not make laboratory tests, nor, even
if it were possible, should he be required to do so. It would seem that
a finding that a device possesses utility, i.e., has the theoretical capacity
to accomplish a claimed beneficial result, would in no wise be contradicted
by the FTC's findings of fact that a patentee's similar assertions as to
actual performance were false and misleading in certain particulars. Had
the nature and purpose of a finding of utility been distinguished and de-
fined, all implication would have been removed that by a grant of a patent
there accrued to an inventor any form of endorsement or immunity from
the general prohibitions of law applicable to all those who advertise in
interstate channels.
Vendor and Vendee-Insurance--Risk of Loss-Vendee Can Re-
quire Vendor's Insurer to Pay Insurance Money to Vendor to Be Held
in Trust for Vendee-On March 5, 1946, vendor entered into an agree-
ment to sell the premises to vendee for $25,000. After execution of the
agreement vendee insured his interest for $25,000. Vendor had policies
totalling $36,500.' On April 25, 1946, prior to final settlement, the property
was damaged by accidental fire to the extent of $49,353. Subseqently, ven-
dee paid the balance of the purchase price and received and recorded a deed
from vendor. The various insurance companies apportioned the loss among
themselves and made payment. Vendor, however, returned the checks he
received and informed his insurers that he had been paid the full purchase
price. Vendee claimed it was entitled to the proceeds of these policies
and sued the insurance companies and the vendor, praying that the in-
surance companies be directed to pay the amounts due under the policies
to vendor's executors 2 who in turn be directed to pay over such proceeds
to vendee. The court here affirmed a decree below granting such relief.
Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Company of North America, et al., 361 Pa.
68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949).
Between execution of a contract for the sale of realty and final settle-
ment, the vendor retains legal title and is recognized as having an insur-
able interest in the premises.3 In all but a few jurisdictions, however,
during this time the risk of loss from accidental damage falls upon the
10. See 52 STAT. 111, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1946).
1. Prior to the agreement to sell the property, vendor maintained insurance only
to the extent of $26,500. On April 13, 1946, after execution of the agreement, he in-
creased this by $10,000.
2. Vendor had died in the meantime.
3. Bauer v. Hill, 267 Pa. 559, 110 Atl. 346 (1920) ; Hill v. Cumberland Vallew
Mutual Protection Co., 59 Pa. 474 (1868); GOLDiN, THE LAW OF INSURANCE IN
PENNS LVANIA 98 (2d ed. 1946) ; VANCE, INsuRANCE 128 (2d ed. 1930).
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vendee, unless there has been an agreement otherwise.4 Since the vendee
must therefore pay the full contract price regardless of destruction of the
property, it would seem that any insurance held by the vendor in his
own name would cover, at most, an interest measured by the unpaid
balance of the purchase price, as that is the maximum loss he might suffer.
Clearly, the vendee's interest in the premises is not directly insured by
such a policy.5 Despite this, the presence of an insurer who has received
premiums calculated upon full coverage of the property has led a decided
majority of American courts to shift the loss to such insurer. This is
usually accomplished by permitting the vendor to recover upon his in-
surance, notwithstanding the vendee's obligation to make full payment,
and ruling that he holds the proceeds, as a constructive trustee, for the
benefit of the vendee.6 Acceptance of this trust rationale was indicated
by prior Pennsylvania cases dating as far back as 1853, but all such cases
could be regarded as treating the matter only in dicta.7 After the decision
in the instant case, however, there can be no doubt but that this jurisdic-
tion adopts the doctrine in its entirety.
Holding the vendor a trustee of the proceeds of his own insurance
for the vendee probably provides one of the clearest illustrations of the
efficiency of the trust device and how it is stretched by the courts in using
it as a "shoe horn" for fitting desired results into tight cases. Trust
language is here employed to give effect to the lay concept of insurance
as being upon the property itself instead of upon an interest therein.8
The end product must be considered equitable. Insurance companies are
required to cover the full risk for which they receive premiums, 9 the
vendor does not get the contract price and indemnification for a loss which
must be borne by the vendee,10 and the severity of the rule which puts the
risk of loss upon the vendee is mitigated. The instant case is also notable
in that the vendee was permitted to initiate this suit against the vendor's
insurer in his own right. The court, thus, appears to have applied the
trust rationale even to govern matters of procedure, giving the vendee a
cestui que trust's right to institute litigation involving recovery of the res
where necessary. It would seem that the same relief and remedies could
be secured to the vendee by a statute, such as that which obtains in
4. For a cross-sectional selection of cases see Comment, 4 Mo. L. REv. 290 n.2
(1939). The rule has been violently criticized. See 4 WlIaSToIT, CONTAcTs § 940
(Rev. ed. 1936); LANGDELT, BRiu ON EQurry JUE SDIcIioN 58-65 (2d ed. 1926):
Griffin, Risk of Loss in Executory Land Contracts, 4 NoTRn DAmm LAW. 506 (1929):
Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 CoL. L. Rsv. 368, 385-387 (1913).
5. A fire insurance policy is a personal contract between the insurer and the in-
sured. Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 Atl. 86 (1936) ; Brownwell v. Board of Edu-
cation, 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925).
6. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 67 Ill. 43 (1873); Skinner Co. v. Houghton, 92
Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85 (1900) ; see Millville Aerie, F. 0. of E. v. Weatherby, 82 NJ. Eq.
455, 457 (Ch. 1913) ; VANCE, INsUmANcE 659-663 (2d ed. 1930).
7. Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200 (1863) (assignment of policy before loss occurred);
Insurance Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513 (1853) (insurance taken out after execution
of contract to sell) ; see Bauer v. Hill, supra; Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Graybill, 74
Pa. 17, 21 (1873) ; Smith v. Faust et al., 92 Pa. Super. 267, 274 (1927).
8. VANCE, INSMAME 662 (2d ed. 1930).
9. If the insurer need pay only that part of the purchase price which remained
unpaid at the time of the loss, it will benefit at the expense of the vendee if the dam-
age done is greater than the unpaid balance. This would be especially inequitable if
the vendee was an effective trader who got the premises at a bargain.
10. Otherwise the vendor is liable to get far more than he had bargained for.
This might invite incendiarism. The vendor, however, should be permitted to retain
a portion of the proceeds equal to the unpaid balance of the purchase price.
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England,"1 giving him an interest in the vendor's insurance and defining
his rights with respect thereto. So long as the courts find a way of pro-
viding the vendee relief through existing legal or equitable devices, how-
ever, such a statute would appear unnecessary and may be, in fact, un-
desirable as it might remove the present flexibility which permits the
courts to cope with hard cases in this field with some degree of facility.
12
11. Law of Property Act, 1922, 12 & 13 GEo. V, c. 16, § 105.
12. It is notable that such provision has been omitted from the UNIFORM VENDOR
AND PURCHASER RISK AcT, 9 U.L.A. 732 (1942) where it might be expected to appear.
See Note, 19 N. CAR. L. REv. 410, 419-421 (1941).
